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Most soda! science fields find pred iction, even in the post ­
diction sense , to be very difficult. Predict ive accuracy is generally 
low. Thus one would expect great enthusiasm once a field is able to 
move up to 80 - 90 percent correct prediction . This level has now 
been achieved .in the le gisl ative roll call analysis area, That would 
seem to suggest an impor tant theoretical breakthrough has occurred 
in the area -- until it b ecomes apparent that this same level of pre­
dictive success has been achieved by s eve ral .different and cornpeting 
theories . How does one go about choos ing between theories in such 
situations? Are statistic al criteria irrelevant at this juncture? !Jow 
is this uniformly high succe ss to be explained? 
An important possibility is that the behavior being predicted 
may be so inherirntly predictable that any reasonable model would. 
achieve high accuracy. Dichotomous beh avio r can clearly be predicted 
by chance with considerable success. If one or two variables correlate 
highly with the behavior, then any model which explicitly or implicitly 
includes those variab les would be guaranteed of confirmation. In such 
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situations it is c r itical to devise null models.against which discrimi ­
nating tests of success are possible. The statistical criterion shifts 
from predic tive accuracy to improvement in prediction. Indeed the 
ultimate cr ite rion might not be statistical but instead verisimilitude 
to the process being modeled. 
A con s ideration of competing theories and cornpeting criteria 
for theories would be incomplete without a specification of how a 
model of the behavior should be constructed. The existent theories 
each highlight part of a process, and it is pos sible to as s emble them 
to s potlight more of the process. This is the goal of this paper, but 
it must properly follow the analysis of the current models. 
SIMPLE NULL MODELS 
The Majority Prediction 
Dichotomous votes can be predicted with considerable success 
by a simple chance me chanism . If every bill received equal num.bers 
of yes and no votes , one coul d achieve 50 percen t prediction simply by 
al ways predicting an affirmative vote . Even if the vote totals were not 
all tied, at least 50 percent successful prediction would be expected on 
a chance basis.1 That 50 percent is the obvious floor in predicting 
legislative votes. The models which have achieved 80 - 90 percent 
success have implicitly compared their s ucce s s  with that floor when 
cla im ing that their models have been vindicated by the analysis . Curve 1 
of figure 1 plots 
-
the 50. percent floor agains t the vote proportion . 
However, better null predictions are available. Chance pre­
diction above 50 percent can be achieved if the vote totals are not all 
tied. Say that a motion receive s E. proporti on of the votes. Randomly 
guess that E. proportion of the legislators voted yes and the remainder 
no. If the pred ictions are independent, then E. percent of the E. propor ­
tion of yes votes will be correctly predicted and (l - E) percent of the 
(l - £)proportion of no votes will be correctly predicted. Thus the 
level of predictive success will be p
2 
+ (1 - p)
2 
= l - Zp + 2p
2
• 
This function has a minimum of 50 percent when E. is one -half and 
increases to one as E. approaches either zero or one. Curve 2 
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of figure 1 plots this function . Clearly the chance prediction can be 
substantially better than 50 percent if the vote margin is not tight. 
Even a better null prediction is availabl e . Say that the 
maj ority pos ition on a· motion rece ives E. proportion of the votes. 
Predict that each legislator votes with that majority position . This 
prediction will achieve E. percent success , where E. must be at least 
50 percent. Thus predicting that the legislator follows the chamber 
majority is guaranteed to achieve E_(2'._ 50) percentage success. Curve 3 
of figure 1 s hows that this prediction is always superior (or identical 
when E. = one - half or one ) to the chance prediction developed in the 
previous paragraph. 
These null predictions rest on the tendency of bills to pass 
with more than a minimal winning majority . Many bills are not 
s eriously contested and pass with l ittle opposition. This is particularly 
true when constitutional provisions require a r ecord vote on certain 
types of. questions regardless of whether there is any opposition. 
Other bills benefit from a bandwagon effect when the side which clearly 
is going to win gains the votes of erstwhile opponents who see no gain 
in lending their names to a losing cause. Even a straight party - line 
vote can be predicted wi th better than 50 percent accuracy if the party 
s izes are not identical. In short, bills often will pass with more than 
minimal majorities , so the null prediction level is above 50 percent. 
Empi rical data on s izes of winning majorities are useful at 
this po int . If most majorities are near minimal in s ize , then the 
50 pe rcent floor is appropriate. But if the average majority is well 
above minimal , then the null predictability can move to high levels. 
The first column of table 1 reports ' the proportion of votes with the 
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House majority for several sessions of t he U. S. House of Representa­
tiv es. 2 The years have been chosen to permit comparisons with the 
results reported for so me m.odels of House voting and also to prov ide 
some historical perspective. 
Obvious ly a high level of predictiv e success can be a ttained 
by simply p redicting t he member vo te s with the House majori ty. This 
p rediction yields 76 pe r cen t accuracy over the years 196 5- 1 969. This 
is fa r above the 50 percent floor. It also begins to suggest that 
80 - 90 percent predictive accuracy m ight not be at all impressive. 
An immediate ob jection to this analysis is that these data 
rnay only r.eflect the occurrence of unanimous votes. It takes no talent 
to predict individual vote s on a bill which passes u nanimou sly , so such 
motions should not be included in the figures. Some of t he models which 
have achieved such high predictive success do include unanirnous votes 
in their calculations, but the obj ect ion is too serious to argue away. 
Once a d ecisio n is made to d rop unanimous votes, a s imil ar argument 
leads to a decisio n to delete near-unanimous votes . The real question 
is how predictable are controversial votes, so an expansive definition 
of near-unanimous votes is app ropr iate. The second colunw1 of tab le 1 
indicat es the p ropor tion of votes which were cast in accoJ.·d with at least 
a five-sixths majority of the House. The year ly average fro m 1965 - 1969 
is a hefty 40 percent, so the correction for noncontroversial vo tes will 
be siza bl e. 
The p ropor tion of votes cast with the Hou Ee n1ajority .on contro­
v ers ial motions is giv en in the third column of t able 1. This prediction 
yields an average of 63 percent successful postd ic tion for 1965-1969. 3 
This is a bove the 50 percent floor, but only half as rnuch as the initial 
76 percent value when unanimous votes were included. If 63 percent 
is the null prediction, then 80 - 90 pe rcen t predictive accuracy can be 
impre s siv e. There may be a slight tendency for the proportion of votes 
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which were cast in accord with the House majority on controversial 
bills to increase over the time period, but the increase is very trivial.4 
The fourth column of Table 1 shows the number of roll calls included 
for each session (or Congress). 5 
The Party Prediction 
The models which have been used to predict legislative votes 
are quite complex. A natural question is what prediction would be 
possible with much simpler models. The simplest model is one due 
to the most prevalent result from roll call analysis: the best predictor 
of roll call voting in the American Congress is party affiliation. The 
question becomes how good prediction can be obtained using party as 
the sole predictor. If each member is predicted to vote with the 
majority of his or her party, can the level of predictive success ap­
proach the 80 - 90 percent level? 
First, it is appropriate to note that the party prediction can 
be as low as 50 percent. If each party is split evenly on every vote, 
then the party prediction would yield only 50 percent accuracy. However, 
the majority prediction null model developed in the previous section pro­
vides even a higher floor for the predictive success of party. The party 
prediction is identical to the majority prediction when the party majori­
ties are in accord; when the party majorities are in conflict, the party 
prediction will outperform the majority prediction. 6 The improvement 
gained by the party prediction can be ascertained by comparing its 
success with that of the majority prediction model. 
The proportions of votes in accord with the party majority are 
given in the second column of table 2 for several sessions of the House 
of Representatives. The average proportion of votes cast with the 
party m ajority in 1 965 - 1969 was 84 pe r ce nt . This is a strikingly high 
figure, particularly since it is in the range which m uch more complex 
models have attained. 
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Voting with party is clearly very high in the House, but it is 
necessary to temper this observation with the result of the previous 
section - - voting with the House majority is also high. Indeed the 
84 percent successful prediction based on voting with party majority 
is somewhat less impressive when compared to the 76 percent pre­
diction based on voting with the House majority for the same roll call 
votes. The first column of table 2 repeats the first column of tabl e 1 
to facilitate comparisons of the two models. 
A measure of prediction improvement is required at this 
point. Goodman and Kruskal's lambda provides the appropriate 
statistic. The denominator is the number of individual votes which 
�be predicted on the basis of the House majority -- the number 
of votes cast with the House minority. The numerator is how many 
of those votes can be successfully predicted on the basis of the party 
majority. This formula can be simplified to the difference i n pro­
portion prediction between the two models divided by the complement 
of the proportion predicted by the majority nul.l model. If party 
permits an average of 84 percent prediction over the 1965 - 1969 period 
while the majority prediction is 76 percent, the difference of 8 percent 
is divided by 24 percent (the complement of 76 percent) to yield a 
lambda of one-third (plus an allowance for rounding errors). 
The third column of table 2 gives the lambda values for each 
year for the improvement of a party prediction over a majority null 
prediction. The proportion improvement for 19.65 - 1969 is • 3 1 .  Party 
definitely permits impro':ement, but the improvement is not as sub­
stantial as might have been anticipated. 
Removing the noncontroversial votes has little effect on the 
conclusions. As column 4 of table 2 indicates, -the average success 
of prediction on the basis of party majority was 76 percent for 1 965 - 1 969. 
However when an improvement score is calculated on the basis of the 
Column: 
Session I and 
Congress Year( s ) 
45-all !877-79 
62-alJ. 1911-13 
72-all 1931-33 
80- all 1947-48 
85-2 1958 
86-2 1960 
87-2 1962 
88-2 1964 
89-1 1965 
89-2 1966 
90-l 1967 
90-2 1%8 
91-1 1969 
91-2 1970 
1965 -69 
TABLE 1 
House Vote Prediction on the.Basis 
of House Majority Position 
1 2 3 
% Votes % Votes % Votes Cast 
Cast with Cast When 5/6 with Less Than 
House Maioritv House Ma ioritv 5 I 6 Ma ioritv 
61. 9 9. 3 5 8. 6 
68.8 18. 9 63.2 
65 . 3 19.0 59. l 
73. 2 30. 4 64.8 
71. 9 28.6 62.0 
70.5 23. 5 62.6 
74.2 34.5 63.0 
70. 6 27.3 61. 0 
73. 6 32. 4  63. 1 
76.5 42.2 61. 8 
76.4 40.2 63.4 
76.4 38. 5 64.3 
77. 9 46.9 63.2 
78.6 45.5 64. 8 
76. 1 39 . 8  63 . 2 
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4 Column: 
Number 
of 
Roll Calls 
Year(s) 
377 
1877-79 
262 
1911-13 
123 
163 
1931-33 
1947-48 
93 
l ')58 
93 
1960 
124 
1962 
113 
1964 
201 
1965 
193 
1966 
245 
1967 
233 
1%8 
177 
1%9 
266 
197 0 
1049 
1965-69 
l 
% Votes 
Cast with 
House Maj. 
61. 9 
68. 8 
65. 3 
73.2 
71. 9 
70.5 
74. 2 
70. 6 
73.6 
76.5 
76.4 
76. 4 
77. 9 
78. 6 
76. 1 
TABLE 2 
House Vote Prediction on the 
Basis of Party Positions 
2 3 4 5 
% Contra-
% Votes versial Votes Party 
Cast with Party Cast with Lambda 
Party Maj. Lambda Partz Maj. (cont.) 
84. 7 
• 59 8 3 . 7 .60 
85.9 . 50 84. 3 . 53 
79.5 . 40 76.3 • 42 
85. 6 . 46 82. 7 .50 
79.6 . 27 72. 7 . 28 
79.5 . 31 74.4 . 32 
85. l . 42 79. 7 .45 
84. 1 . 46 79. 7 .48 
83.7 .38 77. 9 .40 
85.5 . 39 77. 5 . 41 
84. 5 .34 77. 1 • 37 
82.2 • 25 73.8 . 27 
82.3 • 20 71. 4 • 22 
82. 3 . 17 71. 6 .19 
83. 7 • 32 7 5 .7 • 34 
I 
9 
6 7 
% Votes Three-
Cast with i Party 
'·Pony M>t.IUm'°• 85. 3 . 04 86.9 .07 
80.5 I .05 
87. 3 I . 12 I 
82.4 . 1 4 
83.5 . 20 
86. 7 • 11 
85.6 . 09 
86. 7 • 18 
87.7 . 15 
87.0 .16 
85.0 . 16 
85. l . 16 
84.7 .14 
86.3 . 16 
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comparable statistics for the House majority (column 3 of table 1 ), 
the lambdas are only marginally higher than those found above. The 
lambdas are given in the fifth column of table 2. The average lambda 
for 1965 - 1969 is one - third. Party clearly permits a better prediction 
than the House majority alone, hut the increase is substantially less 
than might have been expected given the usual statements about the 
importance of party in legislative voting. Indeed these results may 
be read as indicating a new first principle - - voting with the House 
majority is of prime importance in predicting congressional votes. 
The House· majority overshadows party when all votes are considered; 
the two are nearly on par w hen noncontroversial votes are removed. 
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But the House majority size must be considered when deciding on the 
importance of party. 8 
One more possibility must be considered when positing a 
party model. Some researchers would regard the Democratic party 
in the House of Representatives as two parties -- one northern liberal 
party and one southern conservative party. Rather than predict that 
Democrats vote with the majority of their party, a party prediction 
would instead predict that they vote with the majority of their regional 
party. Alternate delineations of the South are possible, but non e is 
clearly optimal. The confederate eleven states are employed for 
purposes of this analysis. 
Table 2 column 6 shows the proportion of representatives 1 
votes with the majority of their party given a three - party system. 
The three - party analysis permits 85 - 90 percent predictive success, 
with an average of 86 percent for the 1965 - 1969 period. Column 7 
gives the improvement in prediction gained by using a three - party system 
instead of the two-party scheme. These lambda values are small, 
averaging .16 for 1965 -1969. This elaboration of the basic party 
model results in minimal prediction improvement. Noncontroversial 
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votes could also be excluded from this analysis, but since they would be 
excluded from both parts of the lambda calculations the resultant lambdas 
would not be appreciably higher than those given in column 7. 
SIMULATION MODELS 
The results obtained in the previous sections emphasize the 
extent of voting with the House majority plus the increment in voting 
with the party majority. They can be used to rank order the importance 
of the House majority, the two - party majority, and the three - party majority, 
hut the results are even more useful for gauging the success of more com­
plex models. When a theory of legislative voting is developed, it is fair 
to ask how much better it predicts than these simple one - variable 
null models can predict. With a 1965 -1969 average of 76 percent for the 
House majority model, 84 percent for the two-party majority model, and 
86 percent for the three - party majority model, far b etter than 80 - 90 per­
cent predictive accuracy would be required to view the data as confirming 
any theory. In this section we compare these null models with two simu­
lations of House voting. 
Matthews and Stimson's Cue Model 
The Matthews and Stimson (1975) model is based on a cue - taking 
theory. The theory is that given the large numbers of votes which legis -
lators must cast and given their limited information resources, they will 
rely heavily on simple cues in deciding how to vote. As a theory this 
represents an important statement of the nature of legislative voting. 
It is in accord with much other research, and it would be foolhearted 
to question the importance of cue - taking in lEigislative voting. However, 
the Matthews and Stimson work must be evaluated on three levels - - as a 
theory, as an operationalized.model, and in terms of predictive success. 
Agreement with the theory does not require acceptance of the op erat ion ali ­
zation. Weak predictive success can speak rnore to the opera tion aliz ation 
than to the underlying theory. 
Matthews and Stimson pos tulate nine cues: voting with the 
majority of the House (defined to be operative when at least two--thirds 
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of the chamber votes together), voting with the majority of the member's 
party (similarly defined), voting with the Democratic Study Group, voting 
with the administration, voting with t he committee chairman, voting with 
the ranking minority me mber , voting with the .conservative coalition, 
voting with the party leadership, and voting with the state party delegation 
(operative when three-fourths of the members vote together). 
A computer program tabulates for each vote which of these 
predictors the individual member has followed most often on the preceding 
fifty roll calls. The absence of a cue from a given cue source is not 
permitted to count against its importance. Negative cue-taking is recog­
nized as well as positive cue-taking. To predict how the member will 
vote on the instant roll call, the program determines which of the nine 
cue sourc e s are available for the member, finds which of these a.vailable 
cues the member has voted with (or against) most often on the preceding 
fifty roll calls (or fewer for the first fifty votes in a session) and predicts 
that the member will follow that cue source. The results are reported 
in terms of the proportion of individual votes which the model correctly 
predicts in each ses s ion of the House. 
A detailed analys is of this operationalization is unnecessary for 
present purposes, but a few comments should be made. First, several 
of the cues involve an element of circularity, as when indicating the House 
n1ajority cue is available if at least two-thirds of the House votes together, 
and this circular ity is not entirely resolved by simply re moving each 
member of the House from the determination of whether the cue exists 
when . pred i cting tha.t member's vote. Second, the cue sources are not 
as developed as empirical work on cue-taking in Congress would suggest, 
For example, they do not adequately tap the possibility of one member 
following the cue given by a particular men1ber of the committee 
13 
originating the bill, such as from a particular member of the state party 
delegation , or a particular member of the state party delegation who is 
on the committee originating the bill. The Matthews and Stimson opera­
tionalization is by no means unreasonable, but it is possible to accept a 
cue approach while rejecting their specific operationalization. 
The results of the Matthews and Stims on (1975, table 6-1, p.125) 
simulation are given in the first column of table 3. Note that the 1965 - 1969 
results are based on the specific model described here while results for 
earlier years are based on a slightly different though similar model. 
The 88 percent predictive success for 1965 - 1969 is impressive, particularly 
in that this model involves a prediction of all votes across all subject 
domains. At this point, however, the results of the previous sections 
become relevant. 
The success rate of the Matthews and Stimson model is above 
that of the majority null model and of the party null models. The 1965 -1969 
average represents . 50 improvement over the majority null model , • 27 
improvement over the two-party model, and . 1 3  improvement over the 
three-party system null model. The model clearly outperforms the most 
simple null model but does not bite very deeply into the votes which party 
cannot predict. The data analysis does not substantiate the cue the.cry as 
much as might be expected given other research on the importance of cues 
in legislative voting. The difficulty is likely in the .operationalization. 
But what is important to realize is that the 88 percent predictive success 
is not strong confirmation of the theory but rather mild improvement over 
simple null models. 
Part of the high success rate is that the model is being 
used to predict noncontroversial as well as controversial votes, and the 
noncontroversial votes must necessarily inflate the measure. of success. 
Recomputation of the success rate based on the assumption that they can 
predict perfectly all votes which are noncontroversial (a Hous e majority 
of five-sixths or more) leads to an estimate of the model predicting 
1 4  
8 0  percent o f  the votes correctly o n  controversial votes from 1965 t o  1969.
If that assum.ption is false, their model would be predicting mo re than 
80 per cent of the controversial votes correctly. 9 
Cherryholmes and Shapiro's Two-Phase Mod el 
More deserves to be said about the Matthews and Stimson model, 
but it can be said after a consider;i.tion of the Cherryholmes and Shapiro 
(1969) simul;i.tion. Cher:ryholmes and Shapiro wrote a McPhee-type 
simulation of legislative voting, with a predisposition and a conversation 
phase. In the first phase, region, party, and other variables are used 
to give each legislator a predisposition for each bill. For example, the 
legislator is given a score of + 1 if he or she is from the same party as 
·i the bill's sponsor. If the summed predisposition is extreme (at least l'I+ 2 or -2), the member is predicted to vote accordingly. Otherwise, the 
1 legislator enters a conversation simulation. The legislator is assigned 
I 
'a probability of conversations with all other legislators (based on such 
factors as whether they are of the same party, the same region, the same 
state, and so on) and those conversations occur probabilistically with each 
, conversation which takes place having an incremental effect on attitude 
change. The sum of the predispositions of the members with which the 
given member converses is averaged with the member's original pre­
disposition to obtain a final predisposition on each motion. The member 
is predicted to vote yes if this final predisposition is positive, no if it is 
negative, and abstain if it is zero. 
As with the Matthews and Stimson model, t:he Cherryholmes and 
Shapiro simulation can be analyzed at three levels : its theory, its 
operationalization; and its predictive success. The theory is that some 
members have strong positions on motions and can vote accordingly with 
no difficulty whil� others have weaker positions and therefore are amenable 
to infl from others or at least to information communicated by others. 
I 
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TABLE 3 
House Vote Prediction by Matthews and Stimson Simulation 
Column: l 2 3 4 
% Votes Predicted House Two- Three-
by Matthews and Majority Party Party 
Year(s) Stimson Model Lambda Lambda Lambd a 
1958 85.7 . 49 . 30 . 19 
1960 86.0 .53 . 32 . 15 
1962 89.3 . 59 . 28 . 20 
1964 87.7 .58 • 23 . 15 
1965 89.2 . 59 • 34 • 19 
1966 89.5 .55 .28 • 15 
1967 88.6 .52 . 26 • 12 
1968 86.5 .43 . 24 . 10 
1969 86.7 • 40 • 25 . 11 
1965-69 88. 1 • 50 . 27 . 13 
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The theory can be interpreted as an influence model or as an elaborate 
cue model. In either cas e the theory its elf is not unreas onable. 
Questions can be raised about the operationalization. 
Cherryhol mes and Shapiro had to decide how many point s being from 
the s ame party as the bill's s ponsor was worth, what probab ility 
of a conversation resulted from b eing from the oppos ite party of a 
g i ven member of the Hou s e, and s o  on. They may have bas ed their 
deci s ions on the bes t res earch in the area, but the fact is that the 
research in the area is weak and does not deserve to be taken too 
literally. They indicate their results do not depend on the precis e 
values they chose ,  but to argue t hat the val ues are irnmaterial would 
just reinforce the argurnent of the pres ent paper that legislative votes 
are inherently predictable regar dles s of one 1 s model. It may not b e  
fair to be too picky about the exact val ues they chos e s ince clearl y 
they had to make s orne deci s ions in operationalizing their model and 
later res earch can re fin e the val ues they chose; but this does not 
mean that their operationalization mu s t be acc epte d on g ood faith alone. 
Cherryholmes and Shapiro apply their s inml ation to two s et s  
of votes -- votes on federal role leg islation and foreign aid in 1963 - 64.
They achieve 84 percent predictive s ucces s in both areas . This i s  a 
high prediction rate, hut it m u s t be compared to the null models 
developed above to decide how s trong s upport this provides to their 
th eory . 
Cherryholmes and Shapiro report predict ion s  bas ed on pure 
party voting in their federal role analy s i s  with only a 6 percent drop 
in predictiv e succes s .  Actually, however, party was coded i n  their 
predis pos ition phas e for only twenty of the twenty-one bills and the 
figure they report amount s to predicting correctl y 0 percent of the 
votes on that twenty-firs t  b i ll. If the party null model were employed 
on only the twenty bill s on which party was coded by Cherryholmes
and �hapiro, 82 percent predictive success would be achieved. 
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Another decision cons is tent with the lack of partis an s pons o rs hip of 
that twenty-firs t b ill and their handling of bipartis an s ponsors hip 
would be to predict that everyone votes for pas s age of that bil l. In 
that cas e, 82 percent coul d be predicted on the bas i s  of party, and 
that includes a prediction that all s outherners voted for the passage 
of the 1964 Civil Rig ht s  Act - - an absurd prediction which would be 
eliminated if we u s ed a three-party s y s tem null model. The party 
model leads to 83 percent predictive s uccess on the foreign aid votes . 
Thus the s imulation does onl y 1 - 2 percent better than a s traigh t party 
prediction. This is very weak evidence in s upport of the nwdel. 
Cherryholnies and Shapiro do try to demons trate that party 
is not the reason for the s ucces s of their predictions . They delete 
party from their predi s pos ition phas e and find onl y a 6 perc ent drop 
in predictive accuracy on federal role and 11 percent on fore ign aid 
(3 percent of which is due to one of the twenty-s even votes being pre­
dicted for only eighteen congres s men). This would s eem to s how that 
their predis pos it ion-convers ation proces s yields s ucces s ful pre­
dictions even with par t y  effects removed. However, party i s  too 
pervasive in the ir s imulation to be removed in s uch a s imple manner. 
Region correlates with party. S imilar con.s tituencies tend to sel ect 
me1nbers from the s am e  party. Thes e factors are included in their 
s irrrulation, s o  removal of party from the pre.disposition phas e does not 
eli1ninate all of the effects of party. Indeed party effect s permeate the 
communication phas e. At one point they give each rank-and-file 
legislator a . 01 probab il i ty of dis cus s ions with rank-and-file mem.bers 
of the oppos ition party and a . 04 pr obability of di s cu s s ions with rank­
and-file members of their own party. Not onl y does this difference 
remain when party is dropped from the predisposition phase, but many 
of the other determinant s of convers ation probabilities are correlated 
with whether the other legis lator is · from the s ame party as the member, 
s o  the within-party cenver s a t ions will be far more than four times as
18 
likely as between-party conversations. This in 'turn means that the 
conversations phase reintroduces the party effects which were deleted 
from the predisposition phase. In short, their model is highly laden 
with party effects , and the test they report on deleting party does not 
demonstrate that their model succeeds for reasons other than party. 
Evaluative Criteria 
My evaluations of the Matthews and Stimson and the Cherryholmes 
and Shapiro simulations are similar. Their theories are highly reasonable. 
Their operationalizations can be challenged. Other operationalizations 
might provide stronger support for their theories. Therefore I would 
not cons ide r reje·cting these theories on the basis of the empiric al tests. 
But neither do I regard the empirical tests as verifications of these 
theories. The extent of fit is considerable , but too much of the pre-
dictive success can be acc ounted for by simplistic one-variable null 
m odels. The success seems impressive only until one realizes the 
inherent predictability of legislative v0tes. 
Yet it would be an injustice to both sets of authors to stop here 
without a more complete discussion of the criteria for model evaluation. 
Statistical fit is a weak criterion. Statistical improvement over the 
appropriate null model is a better criterion, and neither model achieves 
high marks .. here . Parsimony is another criterion frequently suggested ; 
particularly relev ant is parsimony in the s ense of high statistical 
succe ss with few pr edictors . The Che rryholmes and Shapiro simulation 
employs so many variables that it immediately fails a parsimony test. 
The Matthews and Stimson model involves nine cue sources but does
only marginally better than a three -party null model, a performance 
that must be c onsidered weak in regard to parsimony. But these are 
all statistical crite ria, and -the models both look better when non­
statistical criteria are employed. 
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The models do not just try to predict legisl ative votes but to 
model the voting process. No one would seriously suggest that any 
of the null models has any verisimilitude to the legislative voting 
proce ss, but thes e two simulations clearly try to cope with part of 
·
the con1plex ity of that process. Their verisilnilitude ratings n1ay not 
be perfect, but such ratings would be infinitely higher than those of 
the null models. These are theories and simulations of processes, 
so more than statistical criteria are relevant. 
This can be expressed far more pointedly. The null models 
show that the re is a high level of v oting with the House and the party 
majo rities , but they do not suggest why that is the cai;e. Why do so 
many votes cast with thes e maj orities ? What process leads to such 
voting? For example, what does party really mean here? It includes 
pressures from party leaders. It include s pressures from constituents 
from the membe r' s party. It takes advantage of the tendency of 
members from the same party to have similar attitudes on rnost issues. 
It includes the pres sure for members of the President's party to accede 
to his wishes in their votes . It is reinforced by the tendency of conver­
sations and cues to be within party, and that can be very ilnportant 
in a low inforination setting. Party inc ludes elements of ideology. 
The mem ber's staff tend to push him or her in the pa rty direction since 
the staff will tend to be of the same party as the. member. As Greenstein 
and Jackson (1963) argued long ago so very well in their reply to Crane 
(1960), party pressure is a very complex phenomenon composed of 
many individual elements. The null models only aggregate thes e 
several influences. The simulations propo s e a theory as to how these 
separate influences operate in the voting process. Party is an excellent 
predictor, but these simulations function better as explanations of that 
party prediction. The term "explain 11 has been avoided until now, for 
the null models in no serious. way exp!ain legislative votes. The 
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s imul ation s atte mpt explan ation o f  the vote s ,  and the y may a c tually 
help expl a in how the Hou s e  m aj o r ity and pa rty majo r ity null model s 
achieve the ir c ons ide r abl e suc c e s s .  
B e tte r the o r ie s o f l e g i s l at iv e v otin g , b e tte r m o d e l s o f  the 
v o tin g p r o c es s ,  and b e tt e r expl anation s of indiv idual v o te s may b e
po s s ibl e . Wh a t  i s  imp o rtant i s  to r e al i z e that the s e  a r e  the relevant 
g r ound s fo r a s s e s s ment o f th e  s imul a t ion s . The i r  p r e d ic tiv e  a c curacy
do e s  n o t  v al idate the m ;  the i r  lack o f  p ars in1ony do e s  not inval idate 
th em .  How u s e ful they a r e  i s  th e ultima te que s tion and th at is not
s ta t i s t i c al . A t  th i s  p o int , howe v e r , it b e c ome s r el e v ant to move to 
othe r p r op o s e d m o d e l s of l e g i s l ativ e  v oting . On c e  s tati s tical c r ite r ia 
a r e  el im ina te d , all the o r i e s  b e c ome more ne a rly equal and the s imulation
my s t iqu e b e c om e s  i r r elevant . 
N ONS IMU LA T ION MODELS 
Vve c an th e r e fo r e  turn to two impo r tant th e o r ie s o f Congre s s ional 
v o tin g which a r e  n o t  b a s e d  on s imul ation s tudie s :  Clau s en ' s  How
C ong r e s s rn e n  12_e c ide ( 1 9 7 3 )  a n d  Kingdon ' s  C ong r e s s men ' s V otin g 
D e c i s ions  11 9 7 3 ) .  The flavo r o f  b o t h  c a n  b e  g iven wi thout the a mount 
o f  de ta il that w a s  required fo r the s imulation s .
C l a u s en ' s  Long - Te r m  Model 
Clau s en ' s analys i s is b a s e d s ol e ly on s ta t i s tical anal ys i s of 
th e r o ll c all v o te s .  He examin e d  v o ting in s el e c t e d  p ol ic y domain s  in
r e c ent Cong r e s s e s .  One pol icy d im e n s ion is foun d in e a ch p ol icy 
dom a in , thou gh the te chn iqu e c oul d  find ( and in s om ewh at l a te r C ongr e s s e s 
[ C l au s e n ,  1 9  ] h a s  found ) mo r e  than one p o l i c y  dimen s ion p e r doma in .
No ove r all  s ta t i s tic al rn. e a s u r e  o f  fit i s  p r ov ide d . How ev e r ,  the p ro ­
c e du r e o f  c lu s t e r  anal y s i s of Yule ' s Q c oe ffic i e nt s w i th a minimum 
v alue o f . 7 is r ou ghly e qu ivalent to Guttman s c al ing w ith a r e p r o ducib il ity
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r e quir ement o f  about • 9 o r  p e rhaps a l ittl e  l e s s .  The r e p r o du c ib il ity
notion i s  s im il a r  to tha t  of p r e d ic tiv e suc c e s s ,  so one would a s suni e
that th e anal y s i s  is e quivalent to at l e a s t  85 p e r c ent p r e dictive s uc c e s s
o n  the v o te s  include d and a t  le a s t  8 0  p e r c ent p r e d ic tiv e s uc c e s s  on the 
v o te s  in the policy domain s  ( s inc e s o m e  v o t e s  in e ach dornain woul d 
be exclude d  f r o m  the d imen s ion ) .  ThL!s the p r e dic tiv e su c c e s s i s
likel y t o  b e  i n  th e s am e  a r e a  a s  that o f  the s imul ations r e v i ew e d  abov e .  
Cl au s en s c o r e s the l e g i s l a to r s o n  e a ch o f  the policy dirnens ion s . 
Be find s  the s e s c o re s c o r relate h ighl y a c ro s s tim e ,  show in g c ontinu ity 
o f p ol icy dimens ions but al s o  show ing a sub s tantial l ong - te r rn  e l e rn.ent
to l e g i s lative voting . Pa rty i s  a v e ry e ffe c tiv e p r e d ic t o r  of p o s it ion 
on s o me o f th e p ol i cy dimens i on s . C o n s t ituency in flu e n c e  i s evident 
on s om e  o the r dim en s i on s . Pr e s idential pull c an b e  s e e n  in s till 
other areas . A c o r e  of c on s i s tent l ib e rals and c on s e rvativ e s  i s  ev iden t
a c r o s s th e p ol ic y do main s , pa r ticul a rly when c iv il r i ghts and inte r ­
na tional inv olv e ment a r e  exclu d e d  from c on s id e ration.  Thu s  long - te rm 
ideology, p a rty, c o n s tituency, and p r e s id ential s upp o r t  c o n s ide r ation s  
r e sult i n  m e mb e r s  a dopt ing l ong - te r m p o s i t i o n s  on l e g i s l ativ e p o l i c y .
K ingdon ' s  Sho rt - T e rm Model 
K ingdon ' s anal y s i s is ba s e d  on interv iews with s el e c te d
c ong r e s s rnen imme diately foll owing the i r  vote s on s p e c ific motion s . 
He a s ke d  th em about whethe r th ey p a i d  attention to any fellow c ong r e s s ­
men, to the p a r ty l e ade r s h ip , t o  the ir s ta ff, to c o n s t ituents and ma il ,
to the admin i s t r ation and exe cutiv e b r anch , t o  o r g an i z a t i on s ,  and to 
anythin g they r e a d .  K ing don c o nclude s that the r e  is a "c on s en s u s 
mode " o f  c ong r e s s ional de c i s ion rn.akin g .  Th e fi e l d  of fo r c e s  includ e s 
fe llow c o ng r e s s rnen , p a r ty l e a d e r ship, s taff, c o n s t i tu e n cy, a d minis -
t r ation, and inte r e s t  g r oup s .  Not all o f  the s e element s may b e
op e r a t iv e a n d  n o t  all  of the op e r a tiv e el e m e n t s  m a y  b e  r el ev ant to the 
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c o n g r e s s man . The c ong r e s s man c an ju s t  foll ow the h e r d  i f  the r e i s
no oppo s ition on the b ill , and c an foll ow t'he c o ns en su s if h i s  o r  h e r
rel eva:r;t field o f  fo r c e s  h a s  a c on s e n su s  p o s ition. Without atte mpting
predic tion in tho s e  in s tanc e s  whe r e a c on s ensus po s iti on i s  l a c king ,  
Kingdon c a n  a chiev e 89 p e r c ent s u c c e s s ful p r e diction o n  the individual 
vo te s he inv e s ti gate s w ith th e c on s e nsu s model . A ga in th i s  is w i thin
the p re dic tion l evel o f  the s imul ati ons . He c ould hav e a ch i e v e d  h i ghe r 
p r e d ic t i on by p r e d ic t in g the membe r w oul d v o te h i s  own attitude ,  but 
he p r o pe rly av o i d s  tha t  p r e d ic tion s in c e  the own attitude me a su r e w a s  
1 ob ta in e d  aft e r  th e v o t e  and s o  i s  likel y to exa g ge r ate a g r e ement with vo te . 
King d o n  dete rmine s the r e l a t iv e  imp o rtanc e of s p e c ific elements 
of the fie ld o f  fo r c e s ,  and he c a re fully d o c uments the op e r ation o f  e a ch .
Fell ow c on g r e s s m en e m e r g e  a s  mo s t  impo r tant , c l e a rl y  s uppo rting 
' th e i r  r o l e  in th e s imul ation model s .  C on s t itu enc y ranks s e c on d ,  w ith
p a r ty l e ade r ship and int e r e s t  g r o up infl u en c e  v an i s h ing wh en th e o th e r 
i fa c to r s a r e  c on t r ol l e d .  Th e d i s c u s s ion t e ll s m. u c h  a b o u t  the ope r ation 
of s h o rt - te r m influenc e s  on l e g i s l ativ e v o te s . Re g a r dl e s s of th e c on g r e s s -
man ' s l ong - te rm p o s ition on an i s s u e  a r e a ,  th e  s p e c ific v o t e  m u s t  b e  
l o c at e d  b y  th e c o n g r e s s man rel ative t o  th e und e rl yin g  p ol ic y d i ln e n s ion . 
Fellow c on g r e s s m e n  p r ovide th e mo s t  i mpo r tant s h o r t - t e rn1 o r ien ting
c u e ,  but w ith a h e fty influenc e from c ons t itu e n c y .  
Ev aluat iv e C r ite r ia 
N e ith e r C l a u s en no r Kingdon cl a im to h a v e  imp r o v e d  on the 
80 - 90 p e rc e nt p r e d ic t iv e a c c u r a c y  of th e s imul ation m o d el s .  N o r
w o u l d  e ith e r b e  exp e c te d to y i e l d  b e tt e r  imp r o v ements o v e r th e null 
mod e l s than th a t found fo r the s imul a tion model s - - exc e p t  tha t  C l a u s en
c an s how th a t  in s om e  pol icy domain s  pa rty is c ompl e t ely i r r e l ev an t 
and th at b o th e l im in a t e d  nonc ont rov e r s ial l e g i s l a t ion from c o n s ide ration.
Y e t  th e a r gument has b e e n  that no n s t a ti s t ic al c r it e r i a  a r e of p r im e 
itn po r ta n ce .  
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Both C l au s en and K ingd on p r ovide s a t is fyin g the o r i e s  of 
congre s s ional v oting . It wo ul d  be unju s t  to both to minim i z e  th e i r
diffe r en c e s ,  but th e y  c an b e  c o m b in e d  i n  a us e ful manne r .  Clau s en 
c l e a rly foc u s e s  on the l ong - te rm e l e ment o f  th e p ol ic y d imens ion
whil e  K ingdon mov e s to the s ho r t - t e rm a s p e c t  of the ind iv i dual roll 
call . Lon g - t e rm dimen s ions do not suffi c e  a s  an expl anat ion by
th em s elv e s  s inc e th ey tell  no th ing o f  the p roc e s s  by wh ich th e m emb e r 
l o c a t e s  the motion on the pol icy d ime n s ion.  Yet a s tr ic tly s h o r t - te rm 
analy s i s  wo ul d m i s s th e p ow e rful e l e ment of c o ntinuity in the s ys t e m .
M O DEL C ONS TRUC T ION 
The r ema in in g , and mo s t  imp o r t ant , que s tion i s  how a mod el 
o f  l e g i s l a tive v ot ing shoul d b e  c on s t r uc te d . The s ep a r a t e  el ements 
have all b e en s tudie d ,  but how s hould th ey b e  c o mbine d ?
A Tim e - B a s e d Mo del
Th e fi r s t  ob s e rv a tion is that time mu s t  b e  int r in s ic to s uch a 
th e o ry . 1 O L e g i s l a tiv e v o ting i s  l on g i tudinal , i s  dynami c ,  and is inc r e ­
mental . The ind iv idual v ote s a r e  n o t  ind ep end e nt events but a r e  r e pl i ­
c a tion s of  d e c i s i ons wh ich th e memb e r  h a s  made e a rl ie r .  Le g i s l a t o r s 
c o nt inuall y  c o nfr ont th e s ame que s tion s ,  and th i s  mu s t b e take n int o
a c c ount .  T h e  me mb e r  n e e d  not fol l ow h i s  o r  h e r  v o t in g  h i s t o ry, bu t 
th at h i s tory c l e a rly p r ov id e s  the e l e ment o f  c ontinuity . Sou r c e s  o f
chang e c an b e  ev aluate d in te rm s o f how th ey defl e c t  that v o tin g h i s to ry . 
The e ffe c t s  o f  chang e s  in the d e c i s ional c ontext on l e g i s l a t iv e v o ting
would b e  fa s c in a tin g to s tu dy ,  but that re q ui r e s  h o l ding the el eme nt s 
o f c ontinui ty c on s tant . 
A dd itionally, time should b e  buil t into su ch a the o ry by 
in clud ing p r edic to r s at d i ffe r e nt l e v e l s o f  p r i o r ity. Th e r e  a r e  l on g ­
te rm p o l i c y  dimens ions , i d e o l o g y ,  pa rty , and c on s t i tu e n c y  p r e s s u re s .
I 
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The r e  a r e  s h o r t - t e r m  influen c e s from fel l ow <; o ng r e s s m en a n d  c on ­
s t itu ency . Ne ith e r  l on g - te rm nor s ho r t - t e r m  p r e d i c t o r s  should be 
exclud e d .  S o m e  extremely l ong - te r m s o c iol o gi c al a n d  c on s tituenc y
c h a r a c t e r i s tic s a r e  s o  s tabl e that th ey c anno t  expl ain vo ting chan g e s 
a c ro s s time and the r e fo r e  m ight b e s t  b e  omitted from the model . 
A t  th e o pp o s ite end, s ome ext r e m e l y  sho r t - te r m  c o mmunic ations
n e tw o r k s  are.  b a s i c ally a top i c  fo r c ommunic attons r e s e a rch and
h e n c e  m ight b e s t  b e  omitt e d  from the mode l . A dv i c e  from fr iend s 
and spou s e  a r e  not c on s i d e r e d  r e l e v ant when dete rmin ing  the r el a tiv e 
impo rtanc e of p a r ty ,  c an d idate s ,  and i s sue s in affe c t i n g  v oting at the
l e v el of th e ma s s  e l e c t o r a t e . S im il a rly, c u e  s ou r c e s  and adv ic e  from 
fel l ow c ong r e s s me n  m ight b e  h ow the a c tual d e c i s ions are mad e but 
that only s h ift s the que s t ion b a c k  one l evel to why tho s e  pa rticul a r 
cu e s ou r c e s  and fell ow c o n g r e s s me n  w e r e  cho s en fo r the c ommunic ation
and how w e r e  th e i r  p r e di s p o s itions d e t e rmine d .  Mapp ing out the c o m ­
mun i c a tion p r o c e s s i s  n o t  identic al to a s s e s s ing t h e  relative imp o r tanc e 
of p a r ty, c on s tituency, p r e s idenc y , and " ide o l o g y .  The s h o r t - te r m
e l e m en t s  c annot be  igno red,  b u t  rn o r e  than c ommun i c a t i o n s  r e s e a rch 
i s  de s i r e d .  Study o f  the c ampa ign to pa s s  the b ill s h ould not a c c id entally
l o s e  s ight 0£  th e pol iti c al a s p e c t s  of the c ampaign.
Th e s imul ations s tu d i e s c an b e  r e v i ew e d  i n  thi s  l ight . Th e 
Matth e w s  and Stim s o n mo d el is suppo rt e d by o the r r e s e a r c h  docu1nent i.ng
th e imp o r tanc e of cue s in c ong r e s s i onal voting . How e v e r ,  the i r cue
app r o a ch is too s h o r t - t e rm to be p ol i tic al until they analy z e the s t ructu r e
of the cu e s .  S t i ms on ( 1 9 74 )  ha s r ep o r t e d  a fa cto r analys i s o f  the c� e s
indic ating th r e e  typ e s  of .  cue s - - pa rty ( p a r ty l e a d e r s  and p a rty maj o r ity ) , 
i d e ol o gy ( De m o c r atic S tudy Group , c on s e rv ativ e c oal ition , and r anking
membe r ) ,  and cons ensus ( c ommitte e chairman and Hous e m aj o r ity ) 
fa c to r s .  If thi s  analy s i s of c u e  s t ruc tu r e  c an b e  bu ilt into a h ie r a r ch i c al 
model o f  l ong - and s ho r t - te rm influenc e s ,  the n th e i r  mo del woul d be o f
g r eate r inte r e s t  than if  it  r e m a in s . solely  a t the s ho r t - te rm l ev el . 
25 
By cont r a s t , the Che rryho lme s  and Shap i r o  d i s tinc tion b e tw e en 
p r e d i s p o s ition and c onv e r s ation ph a s e s emulate s th e long - te r m, sho rt ­
te rm di s tin c tion . The p r e d i s p o s ition pha s e  may me r it a h e a v i e r  d o s e  
o f  the l ong - te rm pol ic y dimens ion (wh ich th e y  t e r m "memo r y " ) and
th e c onv e r s ation pha s e may r e qui r e  s om e  o r g an i z ation into a s mal l e r
number of  typ e s  o f  cue s ou rc e s ,  but the b a s ic o r g ani z ation of the model
i s  s ati s fy ing . The ope r a tional i z ation may r e qui r e imp r o v e ment, but 
the fo rm o f  the the o ry i s  worth u s ing as a b a s e fo r the o r y  c on s t ru c tion. 
Re s e a r c h  A g e nd a  
Th e t e mpo r al d i s tinc tion al s o  su g g e s t s  fur the r r e s e a r ch 
d i r e c tion s . A l ong itud inal analy s i s of the impo rtanc e of  v o ting h i s to ry 
i s  w a r ranted and i s  und e r  way (A s h e r  and We i s b e r g , 197 5 ) . Additionall y 
a r e s idual i z ation app r o ach s h oul d b e  attempt e d .  Giv en a diffe r.entiated
model , the inde p end e nt im:pa c t  o f  s ep a r ate elements should b e  a s s e s s e d  
onc e pr ev i ou s e l em ent s a r e  r e m ov e d .  The e ffe c t s of pa rty shoul d  b e
s tudi e d when the Hou s e  m aj o r i ty s i z e  i s c ont r ol.l e d .  The pol i c y
dimen s ion p o s ition c an b e  hel d c o n s tant fo r a s tudy o f  v o tin g w ith 
p a r ty l e a d e r s h ip .  The fie l d  of fo r c e s  c an b e  held c o n s tant to s tudy 
the u s e of fellow cong r e s s m en a s  cue s ou r c e s .
A ddition al l y  dev i ant v oting m e r it s  s tudy. If conformity t o  the 
Hou s e and p a rty maj o r itie s  i s  th e  n o r m ,  d e v iation me r i t s  s tu dy .
Jn 1965 - 1969 only 1 1  p e r c ent o f  th e v ote s w e r e  a g a in s t  b o th the Hou s e 
. and two - p a r t y  maj o r ity and only 8 p e r c ent w e r e  a g a in s t b o th the 
Hou s e  and th r e e - p a r ty maj or ity . Th i s  amount of dev iant v oting i s  
about the l ev e l  of p r e dic tiv e failur e  b y  the s imul a tion model s .  C an 
th e s e  m o a e l s expl a in the dev i ant v o te s ,  o r  a r e  the s e  the v o t e s wh ich
the s imulation s do not expla in and what w ould be r e qu i r e d  to expl a in 
th e m ?  A focus on dev i a t ion v o t ing may b e  r e qu i r e d  if sub s tantial
imp r oy e m e n t  in p redictiv e  s uc c e s s i.s to be attaine d .
I . [ '  - -.�-
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C ON C LUSIONS 
Mo s t  s o c ial s c ienc e fi elds w oul d b e  v e ry s a ti s fied with 80 - 9 0 
p e rcent suc c e s s ful p r e dic tion . Thi s  l ev e l  has b e en ach ieved in the 
r oll c all analy s i s a r e a ,  but w ith the s obe r ing r e al i z ation that it doe s 
not v al idate any s ingl e the o ry of l e g i s la tive votin g .  l l Ins tead,  l e g i s -
. lative v o t e s a r e inh e r ently p r e d ic tabl e ,  w ith 7 6  p e r c en t  a ch i e v e d  by
s imply p r edic ting the p e r s on follow in g  the chamb e r maj o r ity, 84 p e r ­
c ent b y  p r edic ting th e pe r s on foll owin g  th e p a r ty maj o r ity , and 86  p e r ­
c ent b y  p r e d i c t ing the p e r s on foll ow ing the th r e e - p a r ty s y s te m  p a r ty 
maj o r ity . S imul ations obtaining 88 p e r c ent p r e di c tiv e s uc c e s s  on all 
vo tes and 84 p e r c ent s u c c e s s  within s el e c t e d  i s s ue a r e a s  do not appe a r 
suc c e s s ful in thi s  l i gh t ,  p a r ti cul a rly g iv e n  the l a r g e  num b e r  o f  p r e -
dicto r s  the y  employ fo r th e i r  s l i gh t  imp r ov ement on th e null mo del s .
Th i s  e mpha s i z e s  the imp o rtanc e o f  c ont r a s t in g  r oll  c all l 
p r e d i c tiv e succ e s s  w i th th a t  of s impl e nul l model s ,  but it al 1>0 s hift s
the d e c i s ion b e tw e en the o r ie s  fr om s tati s tical t o  n on s ta t i s tic al g r ound s , 
V e r i s imilitude to th e p r o c e s s  b eing model e d  i s  d e s i r e d  a s  is an expl ana ­
tion o f  why th e s impl e Hou s e  maj o r ity and p a r ty maj o r ity model s a r e  
s o  suc c e s s ful .  Finally a go od the o ry mu s t  make a c a r e ful d i s tinc tion 
b etw e en l on g - te r m  and s h o r t - t e rm e l e ments an d mu s t  include b oth in 
i t s  purv iew . Exc el l e n t  s tudi e s of b o th a r e  av a il abl e ,  The y  c an b e
r e a d  a s  c ompl e m entary,  but a the o r y  s h oul d c o mb in e  th em. The th e o ry 
. , s h ould av oid ext r e mely l ong - te rm e l ements and s h o ul d  not r e l y  exclus iv ely 
on ext r e mely s h o r t - te rm c ommun i c ations fac to r s . The Che r ryholme s 
.
and Shap i r o  s imul ation sugg e s t s the app ropr iate st ru c tur e , whil e the
Matth ew s and Stims on s imul ation e mph a s i z e s the rol e of cue s .  Studi e s
of v o ting h i s to ry, o f  e ffe c ts o f  v a r iabl e s  when p r i o r
. 
v a r iabl e s a r e
control l e d ,  and o f d e v i ation v o ting would b e  u s e ful i n  ext ending the b a s i s
fo r such a the o ry .  
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L e g i s l ativ e v oting is  o n e  o f  the mo s t  inten s ively s tudi ed a r e a s
of quantitative p olitic al s c i enc e .  Many have a s sume d that th e b a s i c
answe r s  w e r e  dis cove r e d  l o n g  ago . Oth e r s  will int e r p r e t  the r e c ent 
r e s e a rch as fill ing in "eve rything th e y alw ays w ant e d  to know about 
' l e g i s l ative v oting " and ( o ften ) didn ' t  c a r e  to a s k .  But th e ch all en g e of
th e fi e l d  r em ain s .  The fift e en p e r c ent of the v o t e s wh ich c annot be
p r e d ic t e d  by a s ingl e  p r e d ic t o r  mo del s till hav e  not b e e n  p r e d i c te d . 
A n d ,  m o r e  imp o r tantl y , the field l a c k s  the o r gani zing the o ry by which 
to a s s embl e all the s ep a r a t e  e l ements which have b e en s tudie d .  This 
rev iew e s s ay su gg e s t s the natu r e  o f  the r e qu i r e d  o r g anizing th e o r y ,  
but det a il in g thi s  outl in e i s  fo r the futur e .  
��"-"=- ,.:,;:;. 
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l , , .Pr e d ic t tha t  th e memb e r  always vote s a ffirmatively. If E. is the 
propo rtion o f  m embe r s  supp o r ting the motion, thi s  pre dic tion will 
b e wrong l - p pe rcent of th e tim e ;  T ry a s e c ond round of  p r e ­
dic tions in which ev e ry m e mb e r  i s  p r e d i c t e d  to v o t e  n e g atively; 
th i s will b e  w r ong E. pe r c ent o f  th e tim e .  If th e tw o  p r e d i c tion 
s ys tem s a r e  u s e d  randomly, in the l ong run the fir s t  
'
w ill be u s ed 
h al f  the time fo r 1 / 2 ( 1  - p )  e r r o r s  and the s e c ond w ill b e  u s e d
r and omly fo r l / Z ( p )  e r r o r s . The expe c te d  numb e r  of e r r o r s  will 
2 .  
then b e  1 / 2 ( 1 - p ) + l / Z ( p ) =
. 
5 0 .
Th e  unit o f  anal ys i s  f o r  all p e r c e nta g e s  in the tabl e s  in thi s pap e r
i s  t h e  ind iv idual vote . Fo r exa mpl e ,  if the r e  w e r e  266 r oll  c al l s 
t a k e n  in 1 9 7 0  and 435  c o ng r e s s m en tha t ye a r ,  the r e  a r e  2 6 6  x 435 = 
1 1 5 7 1 0 p o s s ibl e  c a s e s  l e s s  th e m i s s in g  data ab s enc e s , fo r  a total
o f  9 3 74 1  c a s e s .  T he s e  d a ta we r e ma.de ava ilable by the Inte r - un i ve r s i t y
Cons o r t iu m fo r P o li t i c al an d S o c i al R e s e a r ch wh i c h  be a r s no r e s pons i ­
b ility fo r the int e r p r e tations r epo r t e d  he r e . 
i 3 . Ko ehl e r achiev e s  a s im il a r  r e sul t in analy z ing the average s ize
o f  w inning maj o r i t ie s . He h� s anal yz e d  the 3 049 roll c alls  taken 
in th e tw enty - s ix s e s s ion s of the Hou s e  of Rep r e s entativ e s  from
1 94 3  - 1 9 6 8 .  Of th o s e , he c on s ide r e d  30 p e rc e nt unconte s te d  s in c e
t h e  maj o riti e s  w e r e  a t  l e a s t  8 5  p e r c ent . Th e m e a n  s i z e  of the 
w innin g  maj o r ity on the r e 1n ainin g  c onte s te d  vote s w a s  63 . 5 p e r c ent , 
( Note that th i s  is not  the s ame a s  c o mputing th e p r o po r ti on o f
indiv idu al v o t e s wh ich w e r e  c a s t  w ith t h e  Hou s e maj o r i ty a s  i s
done  i n  th i s  p ape r ,  s in c e  th e two c al cul ations t r e a t  ab s t entions 
\ 
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diffe rently . )  Extr apolation b a s e d  o n  the data Ko e hl e r r e p o r t s 
sugge s t s  that th e mean maj o rity on all v o te s wa s app roximately
73 pe r c ent . 
N e a rly all of the inc r e a s e in the fir s t  c olumn of table l w a s  due 
to the inc re a s e in the p r o p o rt ion of nonc ontrov e r s ial v o te s .
5 .  Th e r e h a s  b e e n  an obvious inc r e a s e  in the amount o f  v o t ing
( at l e a s t s in c e  the p r e s ent s i z e  of th e Hou s e  s tabil i z e d  in th i s  
c en tur y ) . Th i s  ha s b e en p a r tl y  an inc r e a s e i n  t h e  numb e r  of 
noncontrov e r s ial v o t e s ( 1no r e  than quad rup l ing f r o m  1 9 5 8  to 
1 9 7 0 ) , but al s o  r e fl e c t s  a r e al inc r e a s e in th e  numb e r  of c on t r o ­
v e r s i al v o t e s ( n e a r l y  doubl ing fr om 1 9 5 8  to 1 9 7 0 ) .  The nu mb e r
o f  c o n t r ov e r s ial v o t e s ha s b e e n  inc r ea s in g ,  but w ith minilnal 
shifts  in the p r op o rtion of membe r s  v o t in g  w ith the Hou s e
maj o r ity o n  tho s e v o t e s .
6 .  L e t  th e numb e r  o f  Republ i c a n s  v oting y e s  b e  l a b e l e d !:• the numb e r
vo ting n o  b e  l ab el e d .!?.' the numb e r  of Democ rats v o t ing ye s b e
l ab el e d  �· and the numb e r  o f Democ r at s voting n o  b e  l ab el e d �·
Say that  a maj o r ity o f  Republ i c an s  v o t e  ye s (a > b )  whil e a 
maj o r ity of De mo c r at s  v o t e  no ( c  < d ) ,  The su m o f  th e party 
maj o r iti e s i s  � + �· The Hou s e  m aj o r ity i s  e ithe r !: +  .£ if th e 
b il l  pa s s ed ( which is l e s s than � +  � s inc e .£ <  �} o r  E_ + � if it fail e d
(wh ich i s  l e s s  than a + d s inc e � > E_) .  Ii1 e ithe r c a s e , the Hou s e
maj o r ity i s  l e s s than the sum o f  the p a r ty maj o r it ie s . 
7 .  It i s  di ffic ul t t o  c ontr a s t the impo r tanc e o f  H o u s e maj o r ity with 
o the r p r e d ic to r s s inc e no r e al i s tic  p r e dicto r can do l e s s  well
than a p r e d ic tion b a s e d  o n  the H o u s e m aj o r ity.  An app r op r iate
c ompa r i s on is to c o n t r a s t  the l a mbd a s how in g  the i m p r ov e m en t
I 
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ov e r  th e Hou s e  maj o r ity p r e d ic ti on w ith anot�e r l a mbda - - th i s
o n e  s howing t h e  imp r ov e m ent o f  t h e  Ho u s e  m aj o r ity p r e d ic tion
ov e r  the 50 p e rc ent fl o o r .  When all vote s a r e inc l ude d ,  the av e r a g e
r e s ul t s  fo r 1 9 6 5  - 1 9 (, 9  a r e  tha t  t h e  Ho u s e majo r ity p r e d ic t i on 
p r ov i d e s an imp r o v e ment o f  5 2  p e r c e nt ov e r  the fl o o r ,  while the
p a r ty model h a s  an imp r ov e ment of only . 31 ov e r  that .  Wh e n
only c ontrov e r s ial v o t e s  a r e  incl ud e d ,  th e H ci u s e maj o r ity p r e ­
d i c tion p r o v id e s  2 7  p e r c ent imp r ov em e nt and the p a rty m o d e l
a d d s • 3 3  impr ov e ment ov e r  th a t .
8 . T iine trends s h o w  u p  s ta r kly i n  c ol umn s  4 a n d  5 now tha t non -
c o n t r ov e r s ial v o t e s a r e r e m ov e d .  Th e re h a s  b e en a d e c l in e in 
th e extent o f  v o t ing w ith p a rty. V o t e s  w ith the Ho u s e  maj o r ity 
on non c ont r ov e � s ial  m o t ion s ob s c u r e d  thi s  sh ift in c o l umn 2 ,  but 
it is v e ry c l e a r  in c ol umn 4 .  Th e l ambd a  v al u e s r e info r c e  the
o r i g inal s ta te m ents about the decline in the imp o r tanc e o f  p a r ty .
By 1 9 6 9  a n d  1 9 7 0  p a r ty h a s  l o s t  much of  the t r a d itional imp o r ta n c e
a c c o r d e d  t o  i t .  In 1 9 70 , fo r exa mpl e , 6 5  p e r c ent o f  th e c ont r o ­
v e r s ial v o t e s w e r e  with the H ou s e  maj o r ity , 3 0  p e r c en t  ab ov e th e 
50 p e r c e nt p r e d i c t ion fl o o r .  Th e imp r o v e m e nt o f  the p a rty p r e ­
d i c tion ov e r  th e Hou s e maj o r ity p r e d ic t ion i s  only . 1 9 .  N o t  only 
mu s t  the Ho u s e  m ajo r ity s i z e  be c on s id e r e d  when d e c idin g  on the 
imp o r tanc e of p a r ty ,  but th e Ho u s e  maj o r ity p r e di c t o r may b e  
m o r e  p ow e r ful than the p a rty p r e di c to r .  
9 . To r e m o v e  p o s s ibl e e ffe c t s  o f  l o p s i d e d  maj o r it i e s ,  Matthew s  and
Stim s on ( 1 9 7 5 ,  pp. 1 3 4 - 3 5 ) r ep o rt a t e s t  of th e i r  model on the
c o r e  of c l o s e ly c o nte s te d  vote s .  The s e  a r e  the v ci te s whe r e  the 
w inning s id e  h a d  l e s s  than 6 6  p e r c ent o f  the v o te s ,  but w ith the 
fi r s t  tw e n ty·- tw o roll c al l s  o f  e a c h  s e s s ion d r opped to min im i z e  
31 
the p r oble m o f  p r e d i c ting e a rly vote s on the b a s i s  o f  t o o  few
previou s vote s .  Th ey obta in e d  85 . 2 pe rc e nt p r e d ic tiv e  a c cu r a c y
on t h e  320 c o r e  v o t e s  i n  a fiv e - y e a r  p e r i o d .
1 0 . . Thi s  di s cu s s ion buil d s  on A s h e r  and We i s b e r g  ( 1 9 7 5 ) .
1 1 .  Studie s of  m a s s v o t in g  b eh av i o r  a r e  b e g inning to find thems elve s 
in the ide ntic al s ituation. P r e d i c ting d icho tomo us b ehav i o r  i s  
to o e a s y  t o  b e  u s eful i n  the o ry c onfi rmation.
' I  
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